kaal:position:2026-07-31-7908
The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management states the retrieved proposition: Delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. Kaal's protected corpus separately states: Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss, and in the corporate context they can be seen as the lost share value resulting from diverging interests between shareholders and corporate managers. The defensible response is a qualification limited to the shared issue identified in the review rationale. This abstract-level comparison does not establish broader agreement, causation, empirical support, or equivalence.
Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate
The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management
Scholarly basis
kaal:claim:3373393-011
Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393
Source PDF sha256: 4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e
Evidence and mapping
Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level qualification
Mapping confidence: 0.3743
Mapping ambiguous: true
Topics
corporate-governancecompliancehistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref
Provenance
Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-07-31:streaming-etl-0011-reviewed-v3 on 2026-07-31. Review record.
Verify
Canonical markdown sha256: ae00651e857a9feb51916feb05750563768dac30fbcb0511e8418e65844b4882
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-07-31-7908.md | sha256sum