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 "name": "Streaming Trust And Reputation In Markets 24C08Ad6Bd",
 "text": "Trust and Reputation in Markets independently identifies reputational incentives as one way to address trust problems in economic transactions. This supports the cooperation mechanism in Kaal's business-reputation claim. The source also lists long-term relations and institutional regulation as alternatives, so it does not establish Kaal's stronger comparative proposition that reputation is the proper incentive rather than money.",
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  "The source states that reputational incentives are one way to solve trust problems in economic transactions. This supports reputation as a cooperation mechanism in business, but it does not establish Kaal's stronger comparative claim that reputation is the proper incentive rather than money."
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  "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210",
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