Extension: No accounting for corporate governance: proxy voting with securities lending

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-047 · 2026-08-08

No accounting for corporate governance identifies a concrete proxy-voting failure: voting rights were not tracked when securities were lent, leading to improper vote counts. This extends Kaal's requirement that voting systems count votes robustly and transparently by showing that entitlement tracking is part of accurate counting. The evidence concerns corporate proxy voting, not quadratic voting or DAO manipulation.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

No accounting for corporate governance: proxy voting with securities lending

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:4529715-019
Wulf A. Kaal, Josh Bykowski, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) – A Market Meta Analysis (2023). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529715
Source PDF sha256: 2d71961e8c449afbeaf45ca4f53de8a575d45c77d6960b767d3d1d0874f296b5

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level qualification
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

daogovernance-designhistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0008-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: ceaf9c4b9a913e09b4b5acd608c8b5399ce6d65bfb39542dc599c509e9e6c6c9
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-047.md | sha256sum