Qualification: Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation

Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-109 · 2026-08-08

Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation concludes that nationalization or harmonization could increase Canadian securities business by lowering firm-level costs. This is a jurisdiction-specific counterpoint to Kaal's claims that jurisdictional competition adapts faster and harmonization can select the wrong rule. The abstract does not compare adaptability over time or establish that harmonization is generally superior.

Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate

Avoiding the Anticommons Tragedy in Canadian Securities Regulation

Scholarly basis

kaal:claim:2029983-006
Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983
Source PDF sha256: fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2

Evidence and mapping

Evidence: abstract indexed
Review tier: substantively reviewed abstract-level qualification
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false

Topics

economicslaw-and-legal-systemsinstitutional-designhistorical-responsescholarly-literaturecrossref

Provenance

Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0011-remainder-0002-oldest-0050-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.

Verify

Canonical markdown sha256: 516132dbd0937ad4ebc4f20cd5748e41afce0bd9ce8511b49cb57e1794cad520
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-109.md | sha256sum