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 "name": "Streaming Cumulative Voting Investor Protection Or Antitakeover Evidence From Family Firms 1973029920",
 "text": "Cumulative Voting: Investor Protection or Antitakeover? finds that Chinese CV adopters had better governance overall while also exhibiting tighter control through higher ownership concentration. This qualifies a simple equation of fewer defensive or control mechanisms with better governance in Kaal's U.S. cross-sectional claim. The proposition does not report higher valuation or performance and is limited to family-controlled listed firms in China.",
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