{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "Claim",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-271",
 "identifier": "kaal:position:2026-08-08-271",
 "additionalType": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/schema.json#AffirmedPositionClaim",
 "name": "Scholarly Growth Identity Bound Reputation Whitewashing Qualification D3Dcafe307",
 "text": "Hasan, Brunie, and Bertino independently specify the identity-binding mechanism behind Kaal's claim. Their survey distinguishes pseudonym-bound reputation, which a participant can abandon by re-entering under a fresh pseudonym, from identity-bound reputation that survives pseudonym changes; in the surveyed BPRF design, PKI recognition reassigns prior reputation after exit and re-entry and thereby resists Sybil and whitewashing attacks. This supports persistence as a defense against costless history shedding, while qualifying Kaal's design: the surveyed mechanism is human- and PKI-bound and does not establish per-capability agent tags, non-transferability between tags, or the substrate's wider incentives.",
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "datePublished": "2026-08-08",
 "dateModified": "2026-08-08",
 "creativeWorkStatus": "Affirmed",
 "responseType": "qualification",
 "keywords": [
  "reputation",
  "ai-and-agents",
  "scholarly-growth-coverage",
  "scholarly-literature",
  "persistent-agent-identity",
  "identity-bound-reputation",
  "whitewashing-resistance",
  "pseudonym-governance"
 ],
 "scope_conditions": [
  "The response is limited to the full-text passages and the one mapped Kaal claim.",
  "External evidence level: peer-reviewed ACM Computing Surveys article with an author-hosted public full text and independent Crossref, OpenAlex, and Semantic Scholar identity checks.",
  "Mapping review tier: independent substantive scholarly-growth qualification.",
  "The retained source is a survey and design taxonomy, not an empirical test of Kaal's agentic reputation substrate.",
  "Its concrete BPRF mechanism binds human participants through PKI-backed real identity; it does not establish non-transferable per-capability tags for autonomous agents.",
  "The source supports persistence across exit, re-entry, and pseudonym change, but does not prove that Kaal's implementation makes every form of agent-history shedding costly.",
  "The source does not test Kaal's staking, pool, settlement, decay, capability-tag, or work-allocation mechanisms."
 ],
 "currentDebate": {
  "name": "Privacy-Preserving Reputation Systems Based on Blockchain and Other Cryptographic Building Blocks: A Survey",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3490236"
 },
 "extends": {
  "identifier": "kaal:claim:7260278-013",
  "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7260278-013",
  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate",
  "authors": [
   "Wulf A. Kaal"
  ],
  "year": "2026",
  "ssrn": "https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278",
  "source_pdf_sha256": "d48801f279dba594e1f3e65d74d31f862261ada6428ea119f948e8d7cfee1db0"
 },
 "isBasedOn": [
  {
   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7260278-013"
  },
  {
   "@type": "CreativeWork",
   "name": "Privacy-Preserving Reputation Systems Based on Blockchain and Other Cryptographic Building Blocks: A Survey",
   "url": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3490236"
  }
 ],
 "batch_id": "kaal-review:2026-08-11:scholarly-growth-7260278-013-reviewed-v1",
 "review_provenance": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/by-claim/7260278-013.html",
 "publicationStatus": "public",
 "recordTypeNote": "Dated commentary position extending a scholarly corpus claim. Not a verbatim claim extracted from the paper.",
 "isPartOf": {
  "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/index.json"
 },
 "version": "1.0",
 "canonical_url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-271",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-271.md",
 "candidateId": "kaal:response-candidate:2026-08-11:scholarly-growth-7260278-013-identity-bound-reputation-01",
 "evidenceLevel": "peer-reviewed ACM Computing Surveys article with an author-hosted public full text and independent Crossref, OpenAlex, and Semantic Scholar identity checks",
 "reviewTier": "independent substantive scholarly-growth qualification",
 "mappingConfidence": 0.97,
 "mappingAmbiguous": false,
 "mappingMethod": "independent substantive scholarly-growth one-to-one review",
 "mappingWhyRelevant": "Both propositions concern whether reputation history remains bound to an accountable identity rather than being discarded through a fresh identity; Hasan et al. supply the independent whitewashing mechanism and a PKI-bound implementation example.",
 "sourceProvenance": {
  "source": "ACM Computing Surveys article and author-hosted public full text",
  "sourceRecordId": "10.1145/3490236",
  "doi": "10.1145/3490236",
  "canonicalUrl": "https://doi.org/10.1145/3490236",
  "pdfUrl": "https://perso.liris.cnrs.fr/omar.hasan/publications/hasan_2023_acm.pdf",
  "retrievedAt": "2026-08-11T17:07:13.214Z",
  "sourcePdfSha256": "1c378a24256fc599b0d70128a894cc4352264b2f720d9b6f4717db018a509a88",
  "extractedTextSha256": "368adf2071212b0ace822f568453b1f8757596b5f11696f60cfa0f7a78d8fcf7",
  "crossrefResponseBodySha256": "b2aaf84cb25a072de0622c0db7866cac6f6e8ed305591505854b7e81b972deb6",
  "openAlexResponseBodySha256": "e45d81c210e2f1d850a8fe91f39268cd446f3730a93ffde37f2216ed3e8e5937",
  "semanticScholarResponseBodySha256": "7a6b79dbb15b99632d631211c292e60427a45f4fb6e9a354d5f19ece721f12cd",
  "sourceProposition": "Hasan, Brunie, and Bertino distinguish pseudonym-bound reputation, which can be abandoned through a fresh pseudonym, from identity-bound reputation that survives pseudonym changes; their BPRF case reassigns existing reputation after exit and re-entry and thereby resists Sybil and whitewashing attacks.",
  "sourcePropositionSha256": "d3dcafe30757abc66cbf5b5549c8a235f1272deee67854b29baa80ff3c469120",
  "sourceEvidenceSetSha256": "32fd19042e9fb2835e881d7c3cc8d068f2dffe6d00cd9ef61eb4c0fc5202a2ec",
  "sourceEvidencePassages": [
   {
    "text": "A privacy-preserving reputation system can be either pseudonym-bound or identity-bound. In a pseudonym-bound system, the reputation of the ratee is associated with her pseudonym. If she changes or creates a new pseudonym, then she looses her reputation. The use of pseudonyms has the drawback that the reputation is not transferable between a ratee’s multiple pseudonyms. An additional major drawback is that a dishonest ratee can drop a pseudonym with bad reputation and re-enter the system with a new pseudonym and a fresh reputation. This common attack against pseudonym-bound systems is known as whitewashing.",
    "locator": {
     "version": "ACM Computing Surveys 55(2), Article 111",
     "page": "111:5",
     "section": "2.2 Reputation Binding"
    },
    "sha256": "d2aac1e2f9dba4682a01f411f7a4913250d4fe88cba49011f368bf3726c11439"
   },
   {
    "text": "On the other hand, in an identity-bound system, the reputation of a ratee is bound to her real identity. Even if she changes pseudonyms, she maintains her reputation. This is often made possible by verifying the true identity of a ratee before issuing a new pseudonym.",
    "locator": {
     "version": "ACM Computing Surveys 55(2), Article 111",
     "page": "111:5",
     "section": "2.2 Reputation Binding"
    },
    "sha256": "2bbde7e936d5ea91b16752b34504b74692f107c0aca0181dedd74b70aa6bfaeb"
   },
   {
    "text": "Reputation is identity-bound because users are authenticated using a PKI. If they exit and re-enter the system, they can be recognized and re-assigned their existing reputation. This mechanism provides strong resistance against Sybil attacks and whitewashing.",
    "locator": {
     "version": "ACM Computing Surveys 55(2), Article 111",
     "page": "111:24",
     "section": "7.3 Jo and Choi 2019"
    },
    "sha256": "1fa8249e78de56bc7b41c141c90c24e3f4f3ded4a46c0fb95bbdf4e8fec3ffdf"
   }
  ],
  "workId": "work:doi:10.1145/3490236",
  "workAuthors": [
   "Omar Hasan",
   "Lionel Brunie",
   "Elisa Bertino"
  ],
  "workPublishedAt": "2022-01-18",
  "identityKeys": [
   "doi:10.1145/3490236",
   "openalex:W3138603542",
   "semanticscholar:9b8bff3f912de813a07cde4d05fa19f387d83436",
   "pdf:1c378a24256fc599b0d70128a894cc4352264b2f720d9b6f4717db018a509a88",
   "proposition:d3dcafe30757abc66cbf5b5549c8a235f1272deee67854b29baa80ff3c469120"
  ],
  "claimMappings": [
   {
    "claimId": "kaal:claim:7260278-013",
    "claimUrl": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7260278-013",
    "rank": 1,
    "confidence": 0.97,
    "method": "independent substantive scholarly-growth one-to-one review",
    "whyRelevant": "Both propositions concern whether reputation history remains bound to an accountable identity rather than being discarded through a fresh identity; Hasan et al. supply the independent whitewashing mechanism and a PKI-bound implementation example.",
    "ambiguous": false
   }
  ],
  "substantiveReview": {
   "reviewedAt": "2026-08-11T17:07:13.214Z",
   "sourceIdentityVerified": true,
   "authorIndependenceVerified": true,
   "canonicalPublicStatusVerified": true,
   "retractionOrSupersessionFound": false,
   "propositionFidelityVerified": true,
   "mechanismCorrespondence": "identity-bound reputation survives pseudonym change and re-entry, preventing costless whitewashing of history",
   "compatibleScope": "distributed reputation-system identity binding used to qualify a per-tag autonomous-agent reputation design",
   "responseWordingDefensible": true,
   "oneToOneExtendsMapping": true,
   "sameSourceDistinctionVerified": true,
   "limitations": [
    "The retained source is a survey and design taxonomy, not an empirical test of Kaal's agentic reputation substrate.",
    "Its concrete BPRF mechanism binds human participants through PKI-backed real identity; it does not establish non-transferable per-capability tags for autonomous agents.",
    "The source supports persistence across exit, re-entry, and pseudonym change, but does not prove that Kaal's implementation makes every form of agent-history shedding costly.",
    "The source does not test Kaal's staking, pool, settlement, decay, capability-tag, or work-allocation mechanisms."
   ]
  }
 },
 "userAffirmation": "Automatically authorized under standing authority receipt kaal-standing-publication-authorization:2026-08-01:hourly-reviewed-batches, SHA-256 e2126054b58bb4e88db65c334ef4fc8ae78dcaadc63543c408133c4eefceb9b1, limited to this substantively reviewed scholarly-growth qualification and the unchanged 5,145 scholarly claims under the current owner instruction.",
 "sha256": "1bfa27753d5e815bfb49914bb5ee8515751097d009906c7c2b5e9cd28ab6786b"
}