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 "name": "Scholarly Growth One Shot Counterparties Persistent Reputation Repeated Game Qualification 0F0877Ad8E",
 "text": "Lie-Panis and coauthors supply an independent institutional-game analogue for Kaal’s iterability claim. Their model places long-lived actors in a repeated game against short-lived choosers who interact only once and exit; observed reciprocation and institutional contribution update the actor’s reputation, which future choosers use when deciding whether to trust. The model therefore shows how persistent reputation can connect otherwise one-shot counterparties to future consequences. It does not test Kaal’s substrate, autonomous-agent calls, or the stronger claim that every consequential call becomes indefinitely iterable.",
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
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  "Mapping review tier: independent substantive scholarly-growth qualification.",
  "The retained paper models human actors, choosers, trust games, and institutional contributions rather than autonomous AI calls or Kaal’s agentic-reputation substrate.",
  "Its one-shot property applies to each short-lived chooser; the actor is explicitly long-lived, so it is an institutional analogue rather than evidence that every call is technically transformed.",
  "The model assumes observable prior-round behavior and reputation updates; it does not test Kaal’s validation, staking, settlement, or zero-residue implementation.",
  "The paper supports a persistent-reputation mechanism for future consequences but does not establish indefinite operation under all failure or identity-reset conditions."
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  "name": "The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2408802121"
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  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate",
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  "year": "2026",
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 "mappingWhyRelevant": "Both propositions connect nominally one-shot counterparties to persistent future consequences; the external model does so through a long-lived actor’s reputation across rounds, without testing Kaal’s substrate implementation.",
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  "sourceProposition": "Lie-Panis and coauthors model a repeated game in which each chooser interacts only once and exits, while long-lived actors proceed across rounds; observed reciprocation or institutional contribution updates actors’ reputations, affecting trust by future choosers and turning immediate costly cooperation into future reputational benefits.",
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    "text": "After the round’s interactions, the choosers exit the game, while the actors proceed to the next round. Thus, actors are long-lived, participating in every round, while choosers are short-lived, interacting only once (our framework is inspired by ref. 34).",
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    "text": "Throughout their life, actors engage in infinitely many interactions. These interactions either involve a chooser in a trust game or involve the population of actors in the institution game (both described below). In both cases, future choosers may observe their behavior, and actors’ reputations are updated accordingly.",
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    "text": "In equilibrium, more patient actors are more likely to reciprocate their partner’s trust and contribute to the institution, since both involve paying immediate costs to obtain future reputational benefits.",
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