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 "text": "Swank and Wrasai provide an independent economic-model qualification of Kaal's functional separation between deliberation and a binding final act. Their collective-decision procedure has three stages: agents acquire information about a project, communicate, and then vote. The model also shows that communication changes incentives to acquire information: when information is cheap, communication can reduce effort through free-riding; when information is expensive, communication can increase effort by making acquired information useful to another agent. This supports the narrower claim that deliberation develops information before a distinct final institutional decision, while showing that the informational benefit is incentive-sensitive rather than automatic. It does not support the broader assertion that adjudication is priced through stake, reputation, sanctions, or settlement, and it does not validate Kaal's agentic reputation substrate.",
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