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 "text": "Engl, Riedl, and Weber provide direct evidence for the identification logic and an important boundary on it. Their laboratory study keeps the public-goods game structure constant across treatments, varies whether and how an enforcement institution applies, and measures effects relative to a no-institution baseline. This design permits causal statements about the institutional treatment. It supports Kaal's premise that a fixed task environment can isolate an institutional contribution. The qualification is material. Engl, Riedl, and Weber use controlled treatment contrasts. Kaal's claim describes a sequential stage arc. Keeping the population, task distribution, and harness fixed does not by itself remove period, learning, order, or carryover effects. The external evidence therefore supports the controlled-comparison principle, but it does not validate the exact stage sequence or the later inferences attributed to it.",
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  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
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  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180336"
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  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Paper 2 - Architecture of the Agentic Reputation Substrate (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7260278",
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