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 "text": "Jindani independently confirms Kaal's distinction between equilibrium existence and equilibrium selection. His peer-reviewed analysis states that the Folk Theorem permits a wide range of payoffs in infinitely repeated games, while existing learning results that converge to equilibrium do not select among those equilibria. Jindani then adds a stochastic learning rule that selects an efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium. The extension is narrow. The result concerns two-player repeated games under specified learning dynamics. It does not show that an autonomous-agent population will select cooperation merely because cooperative equilibria are available.",
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