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 "name": "Reputation Links Current Conduct To Future Work",
 "text": "Reputation links current conduct to future work. Benson, Sojourner, and Umyarov study Amazon Mechanical Turk, where employers may keep completed work without paying and workers cannot rely on ordinary contract enforcement. Their model treats an employer's payment history as a public relational contract. The threat of losing future workers discourages opportunism. Their field experiments then show that employers with good reputations attract workers more quickly and at a larger scale without reducing work quality. Workers for good-reputation employers also earn 40 percent higher effective wages because tasks finish faster and rejection is less likely.\n\nThis evidence qualifies Kaal's intertemporal reputation condition. A visible history changes expected access to future work and the effective price of participation. In that bounded setting, reputation is not a descriptive label. It supplies the link through which past conduct affects future labor flows, payment expectations, and the scale of economic activity that the market can support.\n\nThe correspondence does not validate Kaal's NCLF plus CELM cell. The source studies human gig workers, employer payment, and a third-party rating system. It does not examine autonomous agents, endogenous creation of new work categories, Kaal's pricing architecture, or the stability of his framework. It supports only the narrower mechanism: when work is weakly contractible, an intertemporal reputation signal can discipline conduct and materially affect future work allocation and effective compensation.",
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  "The source studies human gig workers and employers, not autonomous agents or Kaal's computational-abundance arrangements.",
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  "name": "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market",
  "url": "https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3303"
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  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics: A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7261481",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics: A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance",
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