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 "@type": "Claim",
 "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-28-004",
 "identifier": "kaal:position:2026-08-28-004",
 "additionalType": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/schema.json#AffirmedPositionClaim",
 "name": "Cheap Pseudonyms Qualify System Created Identity Cost",
 "text": "Friedman and Resnick's author-hosted draft of 11 August 1999 supports Kaal's system-created identity-cost mechanism while exposing its costs. Cheap pseudonyms let participants escape reputational consequences. Cooperation can be restored through dues, entry fees, or free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, separating persistent identity from public legal identity. Those mechanisms are not costless: dues impose distrust on newcomers, fees may exclude low-payoff participants while failing to deter the wealthiest, and unreplaceable pseudonyms require a trusted intermediary. The draft does not state Kaal's exact accumulated-standing-versus-restart-cost threshold and does not study sovereign agent runtimes. This response cites the 1999 author draft, not the 2001 publisher version.",
 "author": {
  "@type": "Person",
  "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
  "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7840-1847"
 },
 "datePublished": "2026-08-28",
 "dateModified": "2026-08-28",
 "creativeWorkStatus": "Affirmed",
 "responseType": "qualification",
 "keywords": [
  "reputation",
  "risk-and-incentives",
  "decentralization"
 ],
 "scope_conditions": [
  "Author draft dated 11 August 1999, not publisher-version bytes.",
  "Repeated random-matching model rather than autonomous-agent transactions.",
  "Identity-cost mechanisms impose newcomer, exclusion, or trusted-intermediary costs."
 ],
 "currentDebate": {
  "name": "The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms, author draft of 11 August 1999",
  "url": "https://presnick.people.si.umich.edu/papers/identifiers/"
 },
 "extends": {
  "identifier": "kaal:claim:7314479-044",
  "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7314479-044",
  "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Institutional Requirements for Sovereign Local Agent Runtimes (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7314479",
  "paper": "Wulf A. Kaal, Institutional Requirements for Sovereign Local Agent Runtimes (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7314479",
  "authors": [
   "Wulf A. Kaal"
  ],
  "year": "2026",
  "ssrn": null,
  "source_pdf_sha256": "debace24a155ae924a155b1fafe98856d98cf83689feff2f87a32f1c06171ce6"
 },
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   "@id": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/7314479-044"
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   "name": "The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms, author draft of 11 August 1999",
   "url": "https://presnick.people.si.umich.edu/papers/identifiers/"
  }
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 "review_provenance": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions-src/2026-08-28-compound-growth-kaal-growth-2026-08-28-daily-001-remediated-v1.json",
 "publicationStatus": "public",
 "recordTypeNote": "Dated commentary position extending a scholarly corpus claim. Not a verbatim claim extracted from the paper.",
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 "canonical_url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-28-004",
 "canonicalForm": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-28-004.md",
 "candidateId": "kaal:candidate:4f057fa9dd4abe51b887394d63e04ca6cadef412be554a221fad7262d4082d96",
 "evidenceLevel": "permitted_full_text",
 "reviewTier": "independent evidence-first compound-growth review",
 "mappingConfidence": null,
 "mappingAmbiguous": false,
 "mappingMethod": "independent one-to-one proposition and mechanism review",
 "mappingWhyRelevant": "Friedman and Resnick support system-created identity cost without public legal identity through dues, entry fees, and unreplaceable pseudonyms. They do not state Kaal's exact standing-versus-restart threshold and expose newcomer, heterogeneity, and trusted-intermediary costs.",
 "sourceProvenance": {
  "canonicalUrl": "https://presnick.people.si.umich.edu/papers/identifiers/",
  "retrievedAt": "2026-08-28T14:01:14Z",
  "sourceContentSha256": "d933668a78afbca789d73275a83a7deca1af1205b688b863f1104e577a480c2b",
  "sourceProposition": "Cheaply replaceable pseudonyms let participants evade reputational consequences; entry fees or free but unreplaceable pseudonyms can make a new identity costly enough to sustain cooperation, though each design has costs.",
  "sourcePropositionSha256": "bd36e1261d322702aaa575462b6c638c0094900ae5299b9b2e83563f7b90c59a",
  "normalizedWorkId": "doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x",
  "sourceVersion": "author-draft-1999-08-11",
  "exactEvidenceQuote": "We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. We discuss the use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some players with low payoffs, and the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms.",
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    "whyRelevant": "Friedman and Resnick support system-created identity cost without public legal identity through dues, entry fees, and unreplaceable pseudonyms. They do not state Kaal's exact standing-versus-restart threshold and expose newcomer, heterogeneity, and trusted-intermediary costs.",
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