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 "name": "An Honest Majority Is Not A Security Boundary",
 "text": "An honest majority is not a security boundary. In the tested multi-agent groups, initially correct agents defected even when deceivers remained a minority, and susceptibility rose with the deceiver proportion. This evidence qualifies static-majority assumptions and supports governance that measures adversarial influence under the actual composition and protocol. It does not prove the general minority-corruption proposition across voting systems. The evidence is limited to two protocols, groups of at most 21 agents, and descriptive estimates.",
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  "name": "How Does Adversarial Influence Scale in Multi-Agent Systems?",
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30028v1"
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  "citation": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
  "paper": "Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203",
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