kaal:claim:1428387-024

The issuer-buyer relationship and the incentives inside it are unlikely to be able to adequately control the principal-agent relationship between issuer and rating agency so as to ensure accurate ratings.

It seems unlikely that the issuer-buyer relationship and the incentives inherent within could adequately control the principal-agent relationship between issuer and rating agency to ensure accurate ratings.

Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009), V.A.2 Moral Hazard of Rating Agencies, p. 42
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1428387 · source PDF

Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387

• under the issuer-pays rating model for CDOs

failuresupport: arguedfailure: unmonitorable-rating-agentfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismcomplianceai-and-agentscorporate-governance

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 6aa3a280dc6750723be2389f3af2aabf3a16c4ce20e49fcdaddd7f2ea95a67aa. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/e96c7f3180eca8f6...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-024.md | sha256sum