kaal:claim:1428387-024

The issuer-buyer relationship and the incentives inside it are unlikely to be able to adequately control the principal-agent relationship between issuer and rating agency so as to ensure accurate ratings.

Source quote, verbatim
It seems unlikely that the issuer-buyer relationship and the incentives inherent within could adequately control the principal-agent relationship between issuer and rating agency to ensure accurate ratings.
From

Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009), V.A.2 Moral Hazard of Rating Agencies, p. 42
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1428387 · source PDF

Cite as

Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: unmonitorable-rating-agentfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismcomplianceai-and-agentscorporate-governance

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