kaal:claim:1558614-007

The business judgment rule can be read not as a balanced middle ground but as excessively deferential to management, signaling that corporate law is ceding risk regulation to targeted rules aimed at particular risks in particular institutions.

Alternatively, one could view the business judgment rule as be- ing too deferential to management, and an indication that corporate law is abandoning the field of risk regulation to more specific rules aimed at specific types of risk in specific types of institutions

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), I.B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• offered as an alternative reading to the middle ground account of the rule

failuresupport: arguedfailure: corporate law abdicationfamily: board-and-oversight-failurerisk-and-incentives

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