kaal:claim:1558614-009

The cost of tightening directors' duty to monitor risk depends not just on how far the requirement is tightened but on how it is tightened: the mix of agency enforcement versus civil litigation, and of substantive versus procedural change, drives the shape of the cost curve.

from a cost perspective the way in which the monitoring requirement be- comes more stringent matters. The mix between agency enforcement and civil litigation matters; the mix between changes to substantive and procedural rules matters

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), II. Cost vs. Benefit from the Directors' Duty to Monitor Risk, p. 15
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• illustrative model, not based on actual data

mechanismsupport: arguedcompliance

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