kaal:claim:1558614-014

The U.S. governance structure, built on periodic disclosure of performance data and stock price maximization, encourages risk taking because managers feel compelled to meet shareholder expectations at every reporting interval.

Risk taking in this context may be encour- aged by the perceived need to satisfy expectations of shareholders. Managers feel compelled to fulfill performance expectations whenev- er results are disclosed, be it quarterly, bi-annually, or annually.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, p. 21
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• governance systems that emphasize periodic performance disclosure and stock price

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesdisclosurecorporate-governance

• extended_by kaal:claim:2922176-008 Increasing shareholder control over executives can be actively counterproductive: it further incentivizes the ...

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