kaal:claim:1558614-016

U.S. corporate law centers so heavily on shareholder manager conflicts of interest that, absent a demonstrable conflict, it treats risk taking as a situation where managers' and shareholders' interests are aligned and legal intervention is unwarranted.

Risk taking is one of those situations where U.S. corporate law assumes that managers' and shareholders' interests are aligned, or at least not sufficiently di- vergent that legal intervention is justified.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, p. 22
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• no demonstrable conflict of interest is shown

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentives

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