kaal:claim:1558614-027

In In re Citigroup the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to extend the Caremark oversight duty, which concerns monitoring for illegal conduct, into oversight liability for business risk, so an inability to predict the future and an incorrect evaluation of business risk are not breaches of a director's oversight responsibilities.

under the Caremark line of cases would 133 not be extended to impose oversight liability for business risk

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), IV.B.5. No Excessive Risk Taking, No Hazard Decision, p. 34
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

• Delaware law; derivative claims premised on subprime exposure
• oversight liability requires showing the directors knew they were not discharging their duties or consciously disregarded them

empiricalsupport: evidencedfailure: no oversight duty for business riskfamily: board-and-oversight-failurelaw-and-legal-systemsrisk-and-incentives

• restated_by kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-005 Under Delaware law as applied in In re Citigroup, directors' incorrect evaluation of business risk and their i...
• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-014 The German ARAG/Garmenbeck holding is diametrically opposed to In re Citigroup, where the Delaware Chancery Co...

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