kaal:claim:1765901-017

Non-U.S. investors have a strong incentive to route foreign trades through U.S. brokers if that preserves a U.S. cause of action, because their home jurisdictions rarely offer the attractive features of the U.S. system such as broad discovery, higher damages, class actions, and no exposure to defendants' costs.

Indeed, the home jurisdiction of non-U.S. clients of U.S. brokers is not likely to provide many of the attractive features of the U.S. legal system, such as unparalleled discovery, a tendency towards higher damages and settle- ment amounts, the availability of securities class actions

Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011), II. Open Questions After Morrison; 4. Does a Transaction Take Place in the U.S. if a U.S. Broker Is Involved?, p. 15
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1765901 · source PDF

Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901

• a broker location theory accepted by U.S. courts
• non-U.S. clients trading non-U.S. securities

mechanismsupport: arguedinstitutional-design

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