kaal:claim:1998455-001

Government bailouts of systemically important financial institutions create strong incentives for those institutions to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers.

Government bailouts create strong incentives to externalize the cost of SIFIs' risk taking onto taxpayers.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), I. Introduction, p. 4
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where governments provide bailout funding to systemically important financial institutions

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: bailout-cost-externalizationfamily: moral-hazard-and-bailout-expectationsystemic-riskrisk-and-incentives

• extends kaal:claim:1806252-013 Because banks expect to be bailed out with taxpayer funds, they may have less incentive to monitor their hedge...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/8ccd491dee8ffbc6...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-001.md | sha256sum