kaal:claim:1998455-005

Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, contingent capital securities function as an internal, institution specific mechanism that could fill the void left by regulators' apparent inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.

Com- bined with other corporate governance mechanisms, CCSs, as an internal institution-specific mechanism, could help fill a void left by regulators' seeming inability to supervise financial institutions effectively.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), I. Introduction, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where CCS are used alongside, not instead of, other corporate governance mechanisms

designsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalgovernance-designcorporate-governanceinstitutional-designsystemic-risk

• restated_by kaal:claim:2957645-019 Regulators are often unable to supervise financial institutions effectively because of insufficient public fun...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2957645-018 The conversion feature of contingent capital securities has the potential to change the control dynamic, the d...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2957645-025 Contingent capital qualifies as a dynamic regulatory mechanism because capital injection is available only if ...

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