kaal:claim:1998455-019

Switching to contingent capital financing could reinforce rather than dampen risk incentives, and these distorted risk incentives are a drawback of contingent capital issuances.

In effect, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk in- centives and these distorted risk incentives could create draw- backs for CCS issuances.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), IV.A. Adverse Effects, p. 34
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where the issuing institution is already treated as too big to fail
• the author notes these drawbacks are unlikely to materialize in the near term given the nascent market

failuresupport: arguedfailure: risk-incentive-reinforcementfamily: moral-hazard-and-bailout-expectationcontingent-capitalrisk-and-incentivessystemic-risk

• restates kaal:claim:1908473-015 Switching to contingent capital financing may reinforce rather than reduce risk incentives, and whether the ri...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/4005edb7c0040177...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-019.md | sha256sum