kaal:claim:1998455-021

Where institutions hold each other's contingent capital and share similar risk profiles, they will be hesitant after conversion to vote for necessary organizational changes at a competitor or otherwise exercise their voting rights, because they are similarly exposed and may face reciprocal voting power.

With sim- ilar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities, SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor after conversion of CCS into equity.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), IV.B. Conflicts of Interest, p. 35
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where SIFIs hold similar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities
• especially where cross holdings are reciprocal

failuresupport: arguedfailure: reciprocal-voting-passivityfamily: governance-participation-collapsegovernance-designcorporate-governancesystemic-risk

• extends kaal:claim:1908473-029 Information asymmetries between market participants and a systemically important institution's management befo...

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