kaal:claim:1998455-029

The social welfare maximization potential of contingent capital securities is lower if their design features are left entirely to private ordering, because private parties do not necessarily structure those features with a view toward the common good, the avoidance of future bailouts, or the limitation of systemic risk and contagion.

The social welfare maximization potential of CCS could be lower if the design features are entirely left to private ordering.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), VII.A. A Quasi-Public Good, p. 42
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where regulators leave CCS design features entirely to industry groups and private parties

failuresupport: arguedfailure: private-ordering-welfare-shortfallfamily: trigger-design-failurerisk-and-incentivescontingent-capitaldynamic-regulation

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