kaal:claim:1998455-034

Management incentives for risk control are heightened upon conversion, especially where management knows that holders of converted contingent capital would command a majority vote, with or without institutional shareholders.

More importantly, management incen- tives for risk control could be heightened upon conversion, espe- cially if management knows that CCS holders would have a ma- jority vote upon conversion (with or without institutional shareholders).

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), VII.C. Increased Voting Rights, p. 47
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• depends on the volume of CCS issuance, which determines the influence of CCS holders

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designcontingent-capitalcorporate-governance

• extended_by kaal:claim:2061166-021 Contingent capital supports general risk control and reduces moral hazard by holding shareholders responsible ...
• extends kaal:claim:1908473-025 To balance constituent incentives and prevent abuse, the voting rights increase should be calibrated so that c...

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