kaal:claim:1998455-036

If central banks were to purchase contingent capital securities issued by systemically important institutions in the primary or secondary market as part of monetary policy, the prospect of internalizing bank failure costs would be undermined, and primary market purchases could also undermine market participants' confidence in these instruments.

If the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, and other central banks, as part of their monetary policy, were to purchase CCS issued by SIFIs in the primary or second- ary market, the prospect of internalizing bank failure costs could be undermined.

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), VII.D. Additional Considerations, p. 48
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

• where central banks are permitted to purchase CCS issued by SIFIs

failuresupport: arguedfailure: central-bank-ccs-purchasesfamily: systemic-risk-transmissionsystemic-riskcontingent-capitaltokenomics

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