kaal:claim:2061166-007

Even the residual national discretion to set countercyclical buffers between 2.5 and 5 percent is misleading, because a Member State such as the United Kingdom is unlikely to sustain a 5 percent buffer while Germany requires only 2.5 percent and thereby hands German banks a competitive advantage.

The Commission proposal explicitly allows Member States to implement countercyclical buffers of up to 5%, but limits mutual recognition to the 2.5% ceiling. Even in these instances, the proposed discretion may be misleading.

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012), 3. Revisions of the Capital Requirements Directives, p. 25
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166 · source PDF

Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

• buffers set above the 2.5 percent mutual recognition ceiling
• competing national banking sectors, especially where the state holds bank ownership stakes

predictivesupport: arguedfailure: Illusory national discretion above the recognition ceilingfamily: harmonization-and-standardization-failureinstitutional-design

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