kaal:claim:2097160-006

Analyzing executive compensation as a single contract between an executive agent and a corporate principal fails, because it ignores the informal relational element of the principal agent relationship that often overshadows the legal terms of the agreement.

Using a model for the analysis of executive contracts that is based on the single contract between the executive–agent and corporation–principal would ignore the informal relational element of this principal– agent relationship.

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), IV. Incomplete Contract Theory, p. 26
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• executive compensation contracts
• classical contract model or spot contract model

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Spot contract blindness to relational elementsfamily: research-design-limitationai-and-agentscorporate-governance

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