kaal:claim:2097160-007

Control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot sufficiently constrain ex post opportunism by executives, because of incomplete information, information asymmetry, bounded rationality, limited foresight, and transaction costs.

bounded rationality of contracting parties, the parties' limited cognition and foresight, and transaction costs, control rights in executive compensation contracts cannot account sufficiently for ex post opportunism of agents.

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), IV. Incomplete Contract Theory, p. 29
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• principal agent relationship under incomplete contracting

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Control rights fail against ex post opportunismfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismai-and-agentscorporate-governance

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/375d2df84c0cfeaa...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-007.md | sha256sum