kaal:claim:2097160-015

Regulatory triggers insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk, because executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their own risk-taking preferences in order to avoid the trigger.

regulatory triggers may insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk because the executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their risk-taking preferences to avoid the trigger.

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), V.B.1 Automatic Institution-Specific Early Trigger, p. 37
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• conversion decided by regulators rather than by an automatic institution-specific term

failuresupport: arguedfailure: No self-monitoring under regulatory triggersfamily: trigger-design-failurecontingent-capitalcompliancerisk-and-incentives

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