kaal:claim:2097160-027

Executives paid in contingent convertible bonds have an opportunistic reason to manipulate the triggering event, because conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis hands them cheap stock.

Source quote, verbatim
If SIFI executives are compensated with contingent convertible bond instruments, opportunism could lead them to manipulate the triggering event to obtain stock upon contingent convertible bonds' conversion at a depressed price before or during a crisis.192
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), V.C Design Features to Avoid Abuse, p. 48
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Trigger manipulation for cheap stockfamily: trigger-design-failurecontingent-capitalcorporate-governance

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