kaal:claim:2097160-030

If executives influence the drafting of their own trigger, opportunism within the bounds of fiduciary duty will produce suboptimal early triggers and increase the potential for abuse, because executives can use the trigger to obtain cheap stock during a crisis.

Executives' opportunism and involvement in drafting the trigger could result in suboptimal early triggers in contingent convertible bonds issued to executives. If the trigger design allows executives to influence the early trigger, the suboptimal early trigger could increase the potential for abuse

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012), V.C Design Features to Avoid Abuse, p. 51
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

• executives involved in the executive compensation and trigger design process

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Management capture of trigger designfamily: trigger-design-failurecontingent-capital

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/ef90037d7bb214d7...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-030.md | sha256sum