kaal:claim:2267560-019

NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaking process, with the consequence that even optimal solutions to regulatory problems become unstable and suboptimal over time.

Source quote, verbatim
NIE acknowledges that transaction costs, imperfect information, and bounded rationality influence the rulemaking process (Homann and Kirchner 1995; Furubotn and Richter 2005) and even optimal solutions to regulatory problems can become unstable and suboptimal over time.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), III. Rulemaking in a Dynamic Framework, p. 7
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: instability of optimal regulatory solutionsfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationeconomicsrisk-and-incentives

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