kaal:claim:2267560-044

Parties in the incomplete contract model cannot adapt to unforeseen contingencies because they cannot specify ex-ante how those contingencies will be met, and transactions may be foregone or become too expensive if participants cannot rely on efficient and equitable adaptation.

At the same time, parties in the incomplete contract model cannot adapt to unforeseen contingencies because they cannot specify ex-ante how those contingencies will be met (Kreps 1990, 93).

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.2 Organizational Culture, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

failuresupport: arguedfailure: inability to adapt to unforeseen contingenciesfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunisminstitutional-design

• extended_by kaal:claim:2808132-033 Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in rulemaking because the feedback effect supplies rel...

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