kaal:claim:2273857-053

The core problem for financial regulation is timing: governance improvements are not enacted before crises when they are most needed, because the collective action problem makes financial regulation mostly reactive and tied to business cycles.

A core problem for financial regulation is its timing. Governance improvements are not enacted when they are most needed - before crises. Rather, because of the collective action problem, financial regulation is mostly reactive, following business cycles.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), III.2.b Anticipatory Sine Curve, p. 26
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

failuresupport: arguedfailure: regulatory timing failurefamily: regulatory-laginstitutional-designregulatory-failure

• extended_by kaal:claim:2808132-034 A core problem for most regulation is its inaccurate and delayed timing, which follows from the collective act...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2740477-030 Regulation is mostly reactive and follows business cycles rather than preempting crises, because of the collec...
• restated_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008 Because rulemaking is subject to regulatory cycles and to a classic collective action problem, rules are gener...
• extended_by kaal:claim:2740477-028 Adaptive rulemaking reduces the collective action problem because with fewer stable rules, latent majority gro...

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