kaal:claim:2273857-065

The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, giving institutions a reason to comply and self-regulate in order to avoid it.

The threat of heightened scrutiny for institutions subject to a DPA/CIA may help optimize incentives because financial institutions would be subjected to increased monitoring by government regulators only after a first time offense had occurred.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), IV. Implementation, p. 30
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

• DPAs and CIAs applied broadly to financial institutions

mechanismsupport: arguedcompliancerisk-and-incentives

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