kaal:claim:2486570-031

Corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to prefer regulation by prosecution over regulation by legislation because prosecution and execution of an agreement carry large reputational implications.

Because of the large reputational implications of prosecution and N/DPA execution, corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to favor "regulation by prosecution" to regulation by legislation.

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, p. 58
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

mechanismsupport: arguedcompliancereputationgovernance-designcorporate-governance

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Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/f6a60efd8e4065df...json
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