kaal:claim:2714974-032

Indirect regulation through bank capital adequacy standards can reach systemic risk because those standards alter not only banks' credit standards but also counterparty credit risk and therefore hedge funds' level of leverage.

Indirect regulation through capital adequacy standards could also address issues of systemic risk because capital adequacy standards will not only regulate and alter credit standards of banks, but also counterparty credit risk and, thus, hedge funds' level of leverage.

Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016), INDIRECT HEDGE FUND REGULATION, p. 25
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714974 · source PDF

Kaal and Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974

• applies to banks and counterparties subject to capital adequacy standards

mechanismsupport: arguedsystemic-riskrisk-and-incentives

• generalizes kaal:claim:3405660-027 The Basel framework serves indirect hedge fund regulation by aligning regulatory capital requirements more clo...
• extends kaal:claim:1806252-011 Banks' lending practices and counterparty credit risk management can curtail hedge funds' excessive risk takin...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3405660-033 The Basel Framework reduces systemic risk by regulating bank credit standards, which indirectly constrains hed...

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