kaal:claim:2922176-008

Increasing shareholder control over executives can be actively counterproductive: it further incentivizes the damaging emphasis on quarterly financial reporting that reform was meant to cure.

Source quote, verbatim

In fact, it may actually have the counterproductive and unintended effect of further incentivizing a damaging emphasis on quarterly financial reporting.

From

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017), III. Corporate Governance Reform, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 · source PDF

Cite as

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: quarterly reporting feedback loopfamily: short-termismrisk-and-incentivesdisclosurecorporate-governance

Related claims

extends kaal:claim:1558614-014 The U.S. governance structure, built on periodic disclosure of performance data and stock price maximization, ...

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