kaal:claim:2922176-013

Mobilizing investors as stewards leads managers to ask the wrong questions about sustainable success: rather than pushing firms toward innovation and relevancy, such measures simply reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view they were meant to soften.

In fact, mobilizing investors may actually lead managers to ask the wrong kind of questions about what needs to be done to ensure sustainable success. Rather than incentivizing a focus on innovation and relevancy, such measures merely reinforce the centralized shareholder primacy view.

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017), IV. Limits of Corporate Governance Reform, p. 20
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176 · source PDF

Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

• jurisdictions that have adopted stewardship codes

failuresupport: arguedfailure: stewardship reinforces centralizationfamily: short-termismcorporate-governanceinnovation

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