kaal:claim:3125822-013

The tragedy of the commons arises in any system lacking a well designed incentive structure; in blockchain proof of stake design this is the nothing at stake problem, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system.

Source quote, verbatim
Similarly, the tragedy of the commons occurs in any system which does not have well designed incentive structure. This is called the "nothing at stake" problem in blockchain proof of stake design, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system.
From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 4.1.2 Tyranny of the majority and tragedy of the commons problems, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: assertedfailure: nothing at stakefamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentinstitutional-designconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

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