kaal:claim:3125822-013

The tragedy of the commons arises in any system lacking a well designed incentive structure; in blockchain proof of stake design this is the nothing at stake problem, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system.

Similarly, the tragedy of the commons occurs in any system which does not have well designed incentive structure. This is called the "nothing at stake" problem in blockchain proof of stake design, where unregulated systems lead pseudonymous users to abuse the system.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018), 4.1.2 Tyranny of the majority and tragedy of the commons problems, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

• systems without well designed incentive structures
• pseudonymous participation

failuresupport: assertedfailure: nothing at stakefamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentinstitutional-designconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

• generalizes kaal:claim:3782198-010 The incentive design in which originators of TCP requests pay the bill failed to solve web hosting costs, beca...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3125827-003 A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three ...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3782210-014 Reputation must be staked and risked on votes over work evidence, because otherwise the system suffers the Tra...

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