kaal:claim:3266953-016

Putting the counterparties' reputation at stake reverses smart contracting's degeneration, because the opportunity to earn new valuable reputation tokens makes members act in ways that improve the platform over the long term rather than exploit short term arbitrage.

This effect changes if reputation of the counterparties is at stake. With the opportunity to create new valuable reputation tokens, members strive to act in ways which improve the platform for the long term instead of exploiting short-term arbitrage opportunities.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018), Motivation, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

• reputation tokens that can be earned and lost

mechanismsupport: arguedreputationrisk-and-incentivessmart-contracts

• restates kaal:claim:3125827-005 Because the stakes in SPoS are reputation tokens that are far less fungible than cryptocurrency stakes, long t...
• generalizes kaal:claim:3782217-011 In the SchellingCoin approach to oracle design, members stake reputation tokens on their answer to the questio...

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