kaal:claim:3373393-012

The standard remedy of appointing outside independent directors to separate decision management from decision control is undermined because CEOs often dominate the board, which makes the separation much more difficult and hurts shareholders.

Source quote, verbatim

However, CEOs who often dominate the board make the separation of these functions much more difficult, which hurts shareholders.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019), II.1 Remedial Attempts, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393

Holds when

boards where the CEO is dominant

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: ceo-board-dominancefamily: board-and-oversight-failurecorporate-governancegovernance-design

Verify

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