kaal:claim:3782203-009

Condorcet's paradox demonstrates that it is impossible to construct any democratic voting method that will faithfully discover the will of a group, because cyclic preferences can leave no clear winner.

Source quote, verbatim

Condorcet's paradox5 demonstrates it is impossible to construct any method that will faithfully discover the will of a group, with any type of democratic voting system.

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Condorcet’s paradox, p. 5
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

Holds when

three or more candidates
any democratic voting system

Classification

failuresupport: evidencedfailure: preference-cyclefamily: collective-action-and-coordination-failuregovernance-design

Verify

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