kaal:claim:3782203-017

However rules are formalized in a realistic setting, there exist strategies that follow the rules yet subvert the intentions of the framers, so legal strategies will always be available that profit an individual adversary at the expense of the group.

This leads to the intuition that however rules are formalized in a realistic situation, there are strategies which follow the rules, but still subvert the intentions of the fram- ers. There are legal strategies that profit the individual adversary at the expense of the group.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with precommitments, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

• realistic repeated games
• players able to precommit to strategies

failuresupport: arguedfailure: rule-compliant-subversionfamily: regulatory-arbitragesmart-contracts

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