kaal:claim:3782203-018

Reputation policing games explain why a business will rationally tolerate a small level of theft when policing costs more than the loss, which also explains the rationality of long-term parasitic and bullying relationships and creates a need for careful protocol design to prevent that corruption.

Source quote, verbatim
Similar game setups with reputation policing explain the situation where a busi- ness will rationally tolerate a small level of theft when policing is more expensive, such as when a grocer will ignore a street urchin who nabs an apple once per day.
From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with precommitments, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

Holds when
Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: rationally-tolerated-parasitismfamily: reputation-system-gaminginstitutional-design

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