kaal:claim:4755632-025

Concentrated market power in code review undermines internal and external quality controls, leaving the public with no or very weak control over the quality of code review services, and it eliminates downward price pressure because job posters cannot afford to shop for better-priced reviews.

The centralized power also undermines attempts by other industry players to create internal or external controls on the quality of code reviews. As a result, the public has no or very weak control over the quality of code review services it receives.

Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024), Current Players in the Field: No Controls, p. 37
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632

• applies to the centralized code review market

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Control Vacuum Under Concentrationfamily: board-and-oversight-failureeconomicsopen-source-and-code

• extends kaal:claim:4734750-019 Because job posters cannot afford to shop for better priced reviews and must buy market acceptance, centraliza...
• extends kaal:claim:3995709-022 Because customers cannot afford to search for better priced code reviews and are forced into cartel pricing to...
• extends kaal:claim:4734750-025 The existing code review market provides no publicly transparent pricing of review services, and that opacity ...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 972ccebf0c06ac1767a9e443bb95942b7670e806a63c25ee817c368a64c8eca8. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/5a3fab28b0a5bf27...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-025.md | sha256sum