kaal:claim:4755632-036

Reputation scores on the ALE Platform balance supply and demand through a two-sided incentive: requesters with lower reputation scores find workers less likely to accept their offers, and workers with low reputation scores are less likely to be retained for micro task work.

If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters' offers. In turn, low reputation scores for micro task workers result in a lower likelihood of retention

Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024), Removing Cost of Micro Task Work Duplication, p. 48
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, AI Learning - Decentralized Governance to Optimize Human Output Datasets for AI Learning (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4755632

• applies to the ALE Platform reputation scoring system

mechanismsupport: arguedreputationrisk-and-incentiveseconomics

• specializes kaal:claim:4734750-037 Two sided reputation scores discipline both sides of the micro task market: workers become less likely to acce...
• specializes kaal:claim:3128900-026 Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept th...

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