kaal:claim:5225296-021

Slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium in which rational validators adhere to honest behavior, because the expected cost of penalties exceeds any short-term gain available from misconduct.

game-theoretic models, which demonstrate that slashing establishes a Nash equilibrium wherein rational validators are incentivized to adhere to honest behavior, as the expected cost of penalties outweighs any potential short-term gains from misconduct

Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025), Token Locking and Slashing Mechanisms
https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Cryptographic Foundations and Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Secure Proof of Stake (SPoS) Conse (2025). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5225296

• assumes rational validators who value long-term participation rewards

mechanismsupport: evidencedeconomicsconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

• extended_by kaal:claim:6192998-030 Honest ranking strictly dominates strategic ranking for validators whenever the reputation gain from consensus...
• generalizes kaal:claim:6269518-032 Theorem 3b holds that under the integrated solution honest citation is a Nash equilibrium when validators asse...
• extended_by kaal:claim:6244278-028 Under persistent reputation and multiplicative updates in the repeated game, honest evaluation is stronger tha...

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